"The part of our picture of the brain which may always be missing is, of course, the part which deals with the mind, the part which ought to explain how a particular pattern of nerve impulses can produce an idea; or the other way around, how a thought can decide which nerve cells are to come into action" ( 1). This fundamental problem, simply stated in Professor Adrian's w~rds, has. in esset,Ice.been fascinating philosophers and SCientists for centuries, as far back as Aristotle. In quite recent years there have been certain developments in the physical sciences which have made this problem more pertinent than ever: the rapid developments in the area of cybernetics and the construction of several artifacts or automata which show rudimentary mind-like behaviour, the developments through the electrical stimulation of the exposed brain, most significantly in the temporal lobes; progress in neuroanatomy and in neurophysiology notably by Magoun (13) focusing attention on the Reticular Activating System; the refinement of E.E.G. techniques and the invention of the topograph to give the illusion of visualizing the activity of mind in the brain' and perhaps most significantly of all,' therh as been a start in the new field of microphysiology.
How psychological phenomena and physical processes interact has become a crucial problem in Science, and all the more because it is so fundamental. It is, according to Schrodinger (16) "not only one of the tasks, but the task of Science, the only one that really counts". Some scientists avoid the issue by affirming >Professor of Psychiatry, University of Alberta. that it is not a problem that Science cañ ,ac~le. Ashby (3) for example, says, SCience deals, and can deal, only with what one can demonstrate to another. Vivid though consciousness may be to its possessor, there is as yet no method known by which he can demonstrate his experience to another. And until such a method, or its equivalent, is found, the facts of consciousness cannot be used in scientific method". Other scientists dõ ot agree. Ec~les (6), for example, says, mental expenences have the same validity that attaches to our perceptual experiences of things. Hence the observations relating to mind, i.e. mental phenome?a, .are part of the experiences t~a~a SCientist should recognize as providing problems which are suitable for scientific investigation. It is a purely arbitrary and biased procedure to exclude such experiences from the fields of investigation where science may properly operate". And Adrian (1) says, "my own feeling is that before the trouble comes to a head it will have to be solved by some enlargement of the boundaries of natural science, by the progress of psychology for instance. In fact, psychol?gy can hardly get along without commg to terms with the relation of body and mind."
Review~f the literature suggests that the more Significant contributions have been made by the physical scientists. But, as Zilboorg pointed out, scientists generally, particularly in North America, are not trained in philosophic synthesis. They are trained in the skills of observation, measurement and classification but not in logic and the discipline of abstract thinking. What has been gained by precise observation has sometimes been lost through undisciplined or stunted reasoning. This deficiency has not been a serious impediment so long as they were dealing with the simpler aspects of nature. But it has led to persistent errors when dealing with the more complex such as the psychological. Yet there have been many significant developments in the philosophy of Science in the last decade. I shall comment on developments in each of the three basic views of the mind-body relationship.
Parallelism
First, the view which has captured popular imagination down through the centuries is that of mind as an entity, different in kind from the body, though interacting with it. This view we call "parallelism." This dualistic view which was championed by Descartes, 'has been discarded by many modern philosophers, for example Burtt, (5), Stout (19) , and Ryle (15) , because of the seemingly hopeless difficulties of explaining this interaction in perception and in willed acts (Eccles) (6) . Then, as Cyril Burt put it, "Man is more than a carcass loosely coupled with a ghost." Unexpectedly, perhaps, many modem scientists, for example, Eddington. (7), Sherington (17), Adrian (2), LeGros Clark (12) , find in the dualistic view the most acceptable initial postulates for a scientific approach to the problem (Eccles) (6). However, their dualism is hardly the dualism of Descartes. At the time of Descartes the scientific knowledge of the brain was virtually non-existent.
The adherence to some form of dualism seems to stem from the recognition that mind is not explicable in modern physical terms. Grey Walter, with all his absorption in the manifestations of mind in the topographic recordings of brain activity and with the mind-like behaviour of automata, was ready to point out how different the human mind was from its artificial imitations. "No other animal is equipped for being sa-piens" (20) . "The brain can learn-NO other structure can" (20) . "In terms of behaviour, the gist of it is that, when we come across something new, we do not necessarily respond to it at once in a particular manner. We think it over. We can imagine making one of a number of possible responses, and imagine it so clearly that we can see whether it would be, if we made it, a mistake, without having to commit ourselves to action. We can make our errors in a thought and reject them in another thought, leaving no trace of error in us" (20) . It is, according to Walter, these attributes of imagination, calculation, prediction, abstract reasoning, and the deliberate choice of action that are inimitable in the artifacts. "It is in fact a difference of equipment and not opportunity" (20) . Grey Walter's work emphasizes the fact that, although artifacts can be made to simulate some of the behaviour of the human brain, they are vastly different because the mechanism employed is altogether different-different eno~gh to be regarded as being of a· different order. Much of. the uniqueness of mind, of mental phenomena in consciousness, remains inimitable.
In reviewing the evolutionary developn;tent of~an, Walter shows how vastly different IS the human mind from the mentation of animals. "Very early in the human stor~the brain must have acquired the. mecha~Ism .of~hat we recognize in a~tIOn as imagmanon, calculation, prediction. Later came the processes of abstract reason in the control of what we call violence. The operation of these mental controls . . . can be recorded as electrical eddies swirling in subtle patterns through the brain. But our most sensitive instruments, amplifying the electrical charges ten million times or more, detect only isolated and intermittent elements of these higher functions in the brains of other animals . . . The nearest creature to us, the chimpanzee, cannot retain an image long enough to reflect upon it, however clever it may be in learning tricks or getting food that is placed beyond its natural reach" (20) .
From the ranks of the philosophers, Wisdom, in his contribution to the Symposium on "Mentality in Machines", discussed 'as distinctive human qualities the ability to consider alternatives and to want or imagine things. He emphasized, as Walter did, the difference between simulating behaviour on the one hand and reproducing function on the other. What the artifacts fail to do is to reproduce "the way in which the human being works" (21) .
To Wisdom the most important distinction, however, has to do with imagination. "Further there seem to be certain mental capacities, interpretive and valuational attitudes and weighing of eventualities which, if regarded as having certain "reality" involve something that does not display itself in personal-or for that matter in physiological-behaviour. This something is imagination. The peculiar feature of it is that something unreal has real effects. This peculiarity has a more general form; in imagination-situations a human being imagines himself duplicated or else as fused with someone else." "By what mechanism could an artifact imagine some object occupying the place where it itself is without self moving?" (21) .
To put it in another way, and in a word, we have to draw a distinction between processes of men ration on the one hand and processes of consciousness on the other. While there seem to be good prospects of simulating an elementary mentation by mechanical means, consciousness poses quite a different problem. Here we might recall that Aristotle postulated two elements in the mind-"pure-contemplation" and "sense perception". Smithies (18) has put forward quite a radical hypothesis, postulating a psychical world of mental experience in a higher dimensional space than the physical world.
Although our thinking has outgrown the crude mechanical conceptual model of Descartes, we do not seem to be able to dispense with some form of dualism and interactionism. "Many barriers have been swept away since the non-Christian biologist discarded the frontier of the soul. But, as in that case, under a dismantled barrier are often found the traces of some real division which it may have marked or masked. We find such traces again, even while vaunting the continuity of life, as we pass with our measuring rods across the old frontier of the animal and vegetable kingdom". (Walter, 20) .
Mind as Emergent
The second basic view of the mindbody relationship sees mind as emergent, an effluence of the body structure. Expressed in Tyndall's words, "As the bile is a secretion of the liver, so the mind is a secretion of the brain". In another figure, it is the vegetation that grows in the soil of the body structure.
This view, although it allows mind its distinctive qualities, implies a much closer relationship between mind and body.
In this view, in load's words (10) , "mind is a highly refined and attenuated form of matter, a sort of halo surrounding the brain". The territory of the mind is simply an extension of the territory of the body, although it may enjoy a different climate and thereby produce different vegetation. This airy conceptual model of mind and body has been severely punctured by the insight of Piaget. "Consciousness is not a substance. Principles such as that of conservation of mass, etc., do not apply. It is not energy either; the rule of conservation of energy does not hold, and therefore consciousness cannot enter as a cause in physiologic processes. Consciousness seen as energy seems to us a fallacious metaphor. Therefore, it does not make any sense, either, to apply the principle of causuality to consciousness: a state of consciousness is neither a cause of physiologic phenomena nor of another state of consciousness. The relation of cause and effect presumes interference of notions such as mass, force, work, energy and others pertaining directly to the physical world.
While consciousness is none of these things it has very specific and original qualities that become evident through psychologic analysis of operational structures. They cannot easily be explained by materialistic relationships. C-onsciousness is at the source of connections that depend on systems of meaning" (14) .
Experimental evidence from neurophysiology fails to substantiate any close or direct interaction between brain activity and conscious experience. "It would be grossly misleading", Walter says (20), "to let it be thought, as l-oose talk about "brain waves" has suggested, that there is any reason to suppose a priori that recorded patterns of brain activity may have any mental significance. Indeed the reverse is the case; the alpha rhythms, most prominent in the whole pattern, are most regular in their formation when the mental activity is least". Adrian (2) agrees with Walter. Joad (10), much earlier, had affirmed that "The mind does not merely reflect the body; it outruns it, and in so doing initiates thoug~ts and actions on its own account of which the body is merely the registering accompaniment".
On the whole, the conceptual model of mind as the effluence of the brain has only the false appearance of closing the dualistic gap between mind and body.
The Holistic View
In the third basic view of the mindbody relationship, the holistic view, the difference between mind and body is resolved into a difference in approach among observers rather than a difference in the object observed. It is a difference only in the sense that observers approaching from different directions see different aspects of the same thing. For example, concave and convex are different views of the same thing; the single structure has two sides differing widely both descriptively and functionally. A dent in the skull from the outside is a bulge from the inside.
Less than a hundred years ago embryologists were divided into tw-o -opposed camps. The Ovists maintained vehemently that the embryo was the product of the ovum. The Animalculists, just as vehemently, maintained that it was the product of the spermatozoon. Today it seems incredible that they would insist that the embryo must be considered as either the one or the other and that they could miss the idea that it was both together, neither separately. Today we see no problem here. Perhaps a hundred years from now others will lo-ok back and wonder why we wrestled so long over separating mind and body.
The holistic view of the mind-body relationship allows some fascinating "reversible figures" to be seen with psychological phenomena corresponding to physical phenomena. Fessard (8) sees consciousness as "experienced interaction" corresponding to Sherington's "integrative action of the nervous system" (17) . Piaget (14) , from his studies in the developmental changes in awareness, points out how the fundamental principle of reversibility corresponds to the neurological mechanism of feedback. Grinker's phrase that "consciousness transcribes into psychological experience events of outer and inner reality" (9) gives a helpful figure.
When Piaget was called upon at the 1953 Josiah Macy Conference on "Problems of Consciousness" to enter the discussion attempting to explain consciousness 'he said, "I think there is a double sense in the word "explanation". There is a physiologic explanation which relates cause to effect, and effect to cause. But consciousness has a very different explanation, and is never casual; it supposes another kind of structure, and implica-. tions, These two forms of explanation, the one by cause and effect which is the physiologic, and the one by implication which is special to consciousness, should not be confused . . . implication is the explanatory system of mathematics and goes far beyond the casual explanation of physical sciences. There is isomorphism between the explanations of the organic sciences and those of consciousness, but this does not imply that they are the same things; they only follow the same structures" (14) .
By this holistic approach, we are led not to any picture of interaction between two separate entities in a linear relationship, or between two different levels of complexity in a heirarchy of operations, but to the appreciation of different aspects of, or different ways of describing, a single operating entity. "My conclusion", Ayer (4) says, "is, then, that mind and body are not to be conceived as two disparate entities between which we have to make, or find, some sort of amphibious bridge, but that talking about minds and talking about bodies are different ways of classifying and interpreting our experiences. Once we are freed from the Cartesian fallacy of regarding minds as immaterial substances, I do not think that the discovery of casual connections between what we chose to describe respectively as mental and physical occurrences implies anything by which we need to be perplexed".
Conclusion
It seems to me, in conclusion, that in the present state of our scientific knowledge we have to attribute to the human mind qualities that are unique. Though we have means of simulating mechanically some rudimentary functions of the mind, we have no means of duplicating them. The concept that mind is nothing but the effluence of the brain, different only in level of complexity, is not supported adequately by experimental evidence. To be tenable it would need some extension of our fundamental concepts of the forces of nature-an extension to include some principle of metamorphosis to account for so distinct a difference in quality.
Otherwise some form of dualism has to serve us in our liking for a more or less concrete schema. It is currently useful for purposes of scientific description and experimentation, but, in the simplicity of Cartesian dualism, it is now philosophically inadequate.
The holistic concept, in which mind and body are not different "parts" of a person but rather different descriptions of that person, seems to me to incorporate enough "dualism" to be useful for operational research while being the least objectionable to the philosophically.
Summary
From as f-ar back as Aristotle, philosophers and, later, scientists have puzzled over the possible mechanisms by which mental and neurological processes interact. The recent developments in the physical sciences, perhaps particularly in the areas of cybernetics and micro-physiology, have made this problem more pertinent than ever. Review of the literature over the past ten years reveals that while some scientists consider that the mental aspects are beyond the scope of Science the concensus of opinion is hopefully towards some enlargement of the boundaries of Natural Science, perhaps particularly in psychology, which might lead to a clearer understanding of the relation of body and mind.
The significant developments of the philosophy of Science during the last decade are reviewed as supporting one or another of three basic views: 1) Parallelism, the dualistic view championed by Descartes, rejected by some modern philosophers but finding support among several prominent modern scientists; 2) mind as emergent, although championed by load as a modern philosopher this view gains little support from experimental neuro-physiology in the attempts to correlate recorded brain activity with mental activity; 3) the holistic view, which resolves the difference between mind and body into a difference in approach among observers rather than a difference in the object observed, seems to provide the most satisfactory model for operational research while being the least objectionable philosophically. objectionable philosophically. des mecanismes mentaux comme faisant partie du domaine des sciences. Toutefois la majorite d'entre eux tournent leurs regards vers les sciences naturelles, en particulier vers la psychologie, laquelle, ils esperent, procurera un jour une connaissance satisfaisante des relations de fonctionnement entre le corps et l'esprit.
Les plus importantes theories emananr de la philosophie de la science durant la decade passee se rallient al'un ou l'autre des trois points de vue que void: 1) Ie parallelisme, semblable au dualisme soutenu par Descartes, desapprouve par quelque philosophes contemporains rnais trouvant credit aupres de plusieurs scientistes; 2) l'emergence de l'esprit, que bien que defendue par le philosophe load, n' est pas acceptee par les neurophysio-logues lesquels s'evertuent a mesurer la correlation entre l'activite cerebrale et la product mentale; 3) le pluralisme (holistic view) qui regarde la distinction corps-esprit comme le resultat d'une difference dans les facteurs observes par les chercheurs, plutot qu'une dualite dans l'entite examinee. Ce dernier semble offrir le plan ideal de travail de recherche tout en etant le plus acceptable a la philosophie.
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